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1Identication through Heteroscedasticity in a Multicountry
and Multimarket Framework:
The Eects of European Central Banks on European Financial
Markets
Abstract
This paper formally proves that Rigobon and Sack (2004)'s approach of identifying mon-
etary policy shocks through heteroscedasticity can be extended to a multimarket and
multicountry framework. Applying our multivariate framework allows deriving consis-
tent estimators of monetary policy eects. The advantage of our extended approach is
illustrated by applying it to European nancial markets. We analyse monetary policy
actions of the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England, the Swiss National
Bank, and the Swedish Riksbank on major stock indices. First, in line with the Rigobon
and Sack (2004) approach, we nd an increase in the variance of European stock and
money market returns on days when monetary policy committee meetings are held. Sec-
ond, monetary policy actions have a signicant impact on nancial markets. Third, we
discover that ECB monetary policy moves have spillover eects on the British and Swiss
nancial markets, but nd no evidence of reverse causality.
Keywords: Financial markets, instrumental variable estimation, identication through
heteroscedasticity, spillover eects
JEL Classication Numbers: C36, E44, E52, G15
MSC 2000 classication: 62H12, 62P20, 91B641. Introduction
A profound knowledge of the monetary transmission mechanism is essential to eective
monetary policy. Understanding the underlying processes helps central bankers imple-
ment appropriate monetary policy actions. This applies to the transmission of monetary
policy shocks both to the real economy as well as to nancial markets. Here, we focus
on the transmission of such shocks to nancial markets. As a consequence of increased
globalisation, reduced barriers to international capital ows, and computerised trading,
nancial markets are increasingly integrated. Thus, when conducting monetary policy,
central banks need to take into consideration that their policies may aect more than
just one market. In addition, internationally integrated nancial markets react not only
to domestic, but also to foreign, monetary policy. Thus, an assessment of monetary
policy transmission in today's globalised world requires a multicountry and multimarket
approach.
In a seminal paper, Rigobon and Sack (2004) propose to identify monetary policy
shocks through an approach based on heteroscedasticity. They note that the channel
from monetary policy to nancial markets is not unidirected: monetary policy inuences
nancial markets and nancial markets simultaneously aect monetary policy. Accord-
ingly, at least two methodological diculties, endogeneity and ommitted variables, arise
when estimating the reaction of nancial markets to monetary policy. First, there is the
problem of endogeneity, causing biased estimators. Because of the simultaneity between
policy and market reaction, error terms are correlated with nancial market indicators
and with monetary policy indicators. Second, there are factors other than monetary
policy that inuence nancial markets. As a consequence, estimators could be biased
due to omitted variables. Rigobon and Sack (2004) develop an instrument variable esti-
mator to deal with simultaneity of policy and nancial market reactions. However, they
only prove its validity for only one monetary policy indicator and one nancial market
indicator. Given the integrated nature of nancial markets mentioned above, theirs is
possibly a too-limited test of the approach.
Recent empirical literature contains several approaches for estimating the eects of
monetary policy on nancial markets, particularly stock markets. There are basically
two broad strands of this literature. Thorbecke (1997) applies a vector autoregression
(VAR) and an event study to the analysis of the eect of monetary policy on equity
returns. He nds evidence that there are monetary policy risk premia in stock returns
and that stock markets signicantly react to monetary policy shocks. In line with this
nding, Patelis (1997) examines short-run eects of monetary policy on stock returns. He
1applies VAR and multivariate regressions to study short- and long-run eects and nds
a negative association between monetary policy shocks and expected returns. Bjornland
and Leitemo (2009) and Bredin et al. (2010) also employ a VAR framework. Bjornland
and Leitemo (2009) discover evidence that the S&P 500 reacts to monetary policy and
evidence that the federal funds rate reacts to stock market shocks. Bredin et al. (2010)
nd spillover eects of US monetary policy shocks on German and British excess bond
returns.
Some studies of monetary policy eects employ higher frequency data, typically daily.
Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) taking an event-study approach, nd
evidence that Federal Reserve monetary policy has an impact on US stock and bond
markets. However, due to the endogeneity problem touched on above, an event-study
analysis provides potentially biased estimates. Rigobon (2003) develops a model based
on instrumental variables estimation to correct for such a bias. He utilises heteroscedas-
ticity in the data to derive adequate instruments. Rigobon and Sack (2004) apply the
identication through heteroscedasticity approach to the analysis of monetary policy
shocks on US major stock indices and bond markets, with ndings that support earlier
results by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).
European nancial markets have also been studied. Andersson (2007) uses intraday
data in an analysis of monetary policy shocks on US and European nancial markets.
He nds that monetary policy decisions increase stock and bond market volatility in
both regions but that the eect is more pronounced in the United States. Bohl et al.
(2009), Sondermann et al. (2009), and Kholodilin et al. (2009) apply the identication
through heteroscedasticity approach to European markets. Bohl et al. (2009) employ a
sample of about 40 monetary policy shock dates, most of which occurred before 2003.
The authors analyse the reaction of major stock indices (German, Spanish, Italian, and
French) to ECB monetary policy shocks. In a follow-up paper, Sondermann et al. (2009)
to also cover the Austrian, Belgian, Finnish, Irish, Dutch, and Portuguese stock market
indices. Kholodilin et al. (2009) apply the approach to various sectoral indices. All
papers report signicant eects of ECB monetary policy on European nancial markets.
However, all these studies focus exclusively on the eects of domestic monetary policy
on domestic nancial markets; that is, they neglect the possible spillover eects of foreign
central bank monetary policy on domestic equity indices. Put dierently, extant analyses
are performed in a bivariate setting and, due to omitted variables, the estimators they
rely on are potentially biased. Noting the potential importance of international spillover
eects, monticini05 apply two-country event studies to the United Kingdom, the euro
2area, and the United States. They nd evidence for spillovers of US monetary policy on
European stock and bond markets, but not vice versa. British rates, however, react only
marginally to FED policy. Hayo et al. (2010), Hayo and Neuenkirch (2011) and Hayo
et al. (2011) nd evidence of signicant reactions by mature and emerging nancial
markets to US monetary policy action and communication, respectively. Hayo et al.
(2011) apply a GARCH model to daily nancial data and discover that monetary policy
communication by Fed ocials aects Canadian nancial market, but that Canadian
monetary policy communication does not aect US nancial markets. In their analysis
of US and Australian monetary policy, Craine and Martin (2008) make the rst and,
at analysing monetary policy spillover eects in the framework of identication through
heteroscedasticity. They extend it to a two-country, two-market framework.1 They nd
evidence that US monetary policy has an impact on Australian markets but not vice
versa. Ehrmann et al. (2010) apply the approach on European and US markets and
nd signicant cross-over eects. However, they do not provide the full proof of the
extension of this approach, neither.
This paper makes novel contributions to the literature. First, we formally and rigor-
ously prove that Rigobon and Sack (2004)'s approach can be extended to a multinational
and multimarket framework. Thus, our method has the potential to solve the endogene-
ity and omitted variables problems. We show that only few assumptions are necessary to
implement this model in an instrumental variable framework and that the instruments
can be generated within the model. In our view, proving that the Rigobon and Sack
(2004) approach can be applied to studying monetary policy in globalised nancial mar-
kets greatly enhances its utility. Second, a multinational and multimarket framework is
of particular interest in the study of the impact of monetary policy on European nan-
cial markets, which are highly integrated. Thus, in this application we simultaneously
analyse the eects of ECB monetary policy on various euro-area markets (multimarket)
and spillover eects from other European monetary policies (multinational). Given the
high degree of European nancial market integration, we expect sizable national spillover
eects of monetary policy, particularly from the European Central Bank (ECB), to Eu-
ropean nancial markets outside the European Monetary Union.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 generalises Rigobon and Sack (2004)'s
approach to the mulitmarket and multicountry case and formally derives important
characteristics of the estimator. Section 3 applies this approach to European stock
1Although they extend the basic framework to a multicountry and multimarket framework in their
application, they provide a (somewhat sketchy) formal proof only for the two-country, two-market case.
3markets, specically four dierent central bank actions and eight stock markets. A
description of the data is followed by the results of the instrumental variables estimation
approach and their interpretation as well as a robustness check. Section 4 concludes.
2. Methodology
Endogeneity and omitted variables are two major obstacles when analysing the eect
of monetary policy on nancial markets. A country's short-term interest rate, a widely
used indicator of monetary policy stance, could be inuenced not only by domestic
asset prices but also by asset prices in foreign countries. At the same time, a country's
asset prices could be aected by both domestic and foreign short-term interest rates.
Rigobon and Sack (2004)'s framework addresses this issue by applying a simultaneous
equation framework estimated by instrumental variables. However, their approach does
not address the problem of omitted variables, neither with respect to spillover eects
from foreign monetary policy and other nancial markets nor with respect to additional
factors. To overcome this shortcoming, we extend their framework to a multicountry and
multimarket setting and allow a set of macroeconomic variables to enter the model. By
including variables that account for business cycle eects, liquidity premia, shocks, and
so forth, we avoid the problem of omitted variables. The model is specied as follows:
i1t = 1;1s1t + 2;1s2t + ::: + n;1snt + 1;1zt + "1t; (1.1)
s1t = 1;1i1t + 2;1i2t + ::: + n;1int + 1;2zt + 1t; (1.2)
. . .
int = 1;ns1t + 2;ns2t + ::: + n;nsnt + n;1zt + "nt; (n.1)
snt = 1;ni1t + 2;ni2t + ::: + n;nint + n;2zt + nt; (n.2)
where ikt is the dierence in the short-term interest rate of country k at time t, skt
is the dierence of the price of an asset in country k at time t, "kt is the monetary shock
in country k, and kt is a nancial market shock in country k. The vector zt is a set of
macroeconomic variables at time t (e.g. risk premia or oil price shocks).
Equations (1.1) - (n.1) are monetary policy reaction functions. They take into account
the inuence of nancial markets and other macroeconomic variables on monetary policy
decisions. However, we are mainly interested in the asset market equations (Equations
1.2) - (n.2), particularly in the estimators k;l, k;l = 1:::n, which measure the magnitude
of the reaction of nancial markets to monetary policy actions.
4Due to the endogeneity problem, OLS estimates yield biased estimators. However,
in a one-market and one-country framework, Rigobon and Sack (2004) show that the
two simultaneous equations can be estimated consistently by means of instrumental
variable techniques. A convenient feature of their approach is that the instruments
are generated within the data. We extended this framework to a multinational and
multimarket framework. Given the validity of the underlying assumption, the generalised
estimator is consistent. Furthermore, this approach requires fewer assumptions about
the variances of the monetary shocks "i than does an event-study approach.
The outline of the proof for the estimator is as follows. We assume that the variance
of monetary policy shocks ("i) is higher on days when monetary policy is actually under-
taken than on other days. Thus, given the institutional framework of monetary policy
decisions, we assume that market participants do not expect monetary policy action
on days when there is no council meeting. We then separate the sample into two sub-
samples. The rst subsample includes all dates on which monetary policy takes place,
henceforth referred to as 'monetary policy dates'. The second subsample includes all
other dates, henceforth referred to as 'other dates'. Variances of monetary policy dates
should be signicantly higher than those of other dates, whereas variances of nancial
market shocks (i) or variances of the set of macroeconomic variables (zi) should be
similar in both samples. For both subsamples, we develop the corresponding covari-
ance matrices. Except for the case of monetary policy shocks, these matrices should be
similar. We utilise this similarity by deducting one covariance matrix from the other.
Thus, only terms containing the monetary policy shock remain as non-zero entries in the
matrix. Then, we obtain the estimator by dividing the relevant entries of the dierence
in the covariance matrix (shift) by the entries in the rst column of the matrix.
As explained above, we split the sample in two subsamples F1 and F2, where F1

















for all countries i, i = 1:::n, t = 1:::T. Furthermore, we assume that all disturbances
5and variables are uncorrelated. To identify the system of equations above, we develop:
ut = Byt +  zt; (4)
ut = ["1t1t :::"ntnt]0, B is the 2n2n coecient matrix, yt = [i1ts1t :::intsnt]0
and   = [ 1;1   1;2 :::   n;1   n;2]0.
To compute the reduced form, and thus solve this equation, we need the inverse B 1
of B. Showing that such an inverse exists is straightforward, as all the rows of matrix




= zt + vt: (6)
Vector vt can be characterised as a structural shock, including both monetary and nan-
cial market shocks. The principal idea of this estimation technique is to utilise the shift
of each subsample F1 and F2, namely E(yty0
t)F1 and E(yty0
t)F2, to obtain an estimator











Given our assumptions (1) - (3), only the covariance matrix of the error term vt is
relevant. The entries of the shift 
 can be used to calculate the estimator. For reasons
of simplicity, we focus on the odd rows of the covariance matrix, as only these are used








11 l1k11;11 ::: l1knn;11
. . .
. . . ... . . .





2A formal analysis of the derived inverse is given in the Appendix.
3A mathematical proof as well as a detailed analysis of the covariance matrices is given in the
Appendix.
4A detailed description of the subtracted covariance matrix is shown in the mathematical Appendix.
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We now implement this estimator in an econometric framework. The denition of the






(Xi    X)(Xi    X)
0: (10)
We calculate the sample covariance matrices of both subsamples and subtract them.
Then we divide the entries of the shift of the sample covariance matrices by the entries


















where (ijtsjt)Fk denotes the covariance matrix of country j at time t in the subsample
Fk.
However, this technique is not easily implemented in practice. We therefore follow
Rigobon and Sack (2004) and prove that an appropriately constructed instrumental
variable estimator is equivalent. Considering that the vector of dierences in the interest





i(t(k);j); t(k) 2 F1
 i(t(k);j); t(k) 2 F2
)
: (12)














We show that a set of the same instruments !ij can be used in the extended approach.5
The instruments !ij are correlated with the regressor but uncorrelated with the error
term and the macroeconomic variables. Hence, the estimator for the reaction of nancial
markets to monetary policy actions can be computed as
b  = (i !i)
 1(s !i): (15)
3. Data and Empirical Results
In this section, we analyse the inuence of monetary policy actions of the Bank of
England (BoE), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Swiss National Bank (SNB), and
the Swedish Riksbank (Riks) on major European stock market indices using daily data
from January 1999 to December 2009. To keep the analysis manageable, we focus on the
largest EMU countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. To account
for the possibility of spillover eects, we include the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and
Sweden in the analysis.6
As our indicator for monetary policy, we use one-month money market rates as mea-
sured by Euribor, Libor, Swiss Libor, and Stibor. These indicators are computed as
daily dierences in basis points. The interbank interest rate primarily reacts to mone-
tary policy actions and much less so to other events, which makes it a good indicator for
measuring monetary policy shocks. We follow Kleimeier and Sander (2006) in choosing
one-month interbank rates because they are less volatile than overnight interest rates
but more sensitive than rates with longer maturities. As stock indices, we employ log
dierences in basis points of daily closing prices for the German DAX, French CAC 40,
Spanish IBEX 35, Dutch AEX, Italian FTSE MIB, UK FTSE, Swedish SAX, and Swiss
SMI7.
The ECB governing council makes decisions on future monetary policy 12 times per
year8 and decisions are announced at 1:45 p.m. on the meeting day. The Monetary
5See the mathematical Appendix for a detailed description
6The United Kingdom and Sweden are members of the European Union but not of the euro area.
Sweden is ocially committed to introducing the euro, but is not expected to join soon. The U K is
not a member of the ERM II and shows little sign of giving up its national monetary independence.
Switzerland has not joined the EU but has many bilateral treaties with it. Both Switzerland and the
UK play an important role in European capital ows.
7Data source: web pages of the respective central banks.
8Until November 2001, the ECB had a dierent meeting schedule.
8Figure 1: Euribor volatility: comparison of monetary policy action dates and the respec-
tive non-monetary policy date
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England also meets 12 times per year, and
its decisions are published at 11:00 a.m. The Executive Board of the Riksbank holds
six scheduled monetary policy meetings each year; decisions are announced at 1:00 p.m.
The SNB meets only four times a year. On these four days, money market rates are xed
before the SNB announces its interest rate decision. We expect markets to incorporate
the monetary policy decisions after their announcement. Thus, as interbank market
rates are already xed on the decisions day, we employ money market quotes of the
subsequent day to capture the change due to the monetary policy move.
We have 167 monetary policy meeting dates for the euro area, 133 for the United
Kingdom, 37 for Switzerland, and 39 for Sweden.9 Following Rigobon and Sack (2004),
we employ the days preceding the council meeting dates as non-monetary policy dates so
as to avoid unpredictable inuences from other economic factors that might accelerate
or decelerate the impact of monetary policy actions.
Focussing on the Euribor, Figure 1 illustrates graphically that the identication
through heteroscedasticity approach works well in our sample. Standard deviations
9Since some of these dates coincide, we have a total of 293 monetary policy meeting dates. In the
sample period occurring before the nancial crisis, we have 144 monetary policy dates for the euro area,
112 monetary policy dates for the United Kingdom, 35 dates for Switzerland, and 32 for Sweden; a
total of 251 monetary policy action dates before the crisis. Our system approach requires the same
number of observations for each country. Since some of the dates do not contain observations on stock
price indices due to country-specic public holidays, some days had to be excluded. Furthermore, we
excluded 6/11/2008 and 4/12/2008, as bank rates were reduced by 100 basis points on these occasions,
generating huge leverage eects.
9Table 1: Descriptive statistics (in reactions to domestic monetary policy decisions)













F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2
DAX 30 72.59 67.92 -0.12 0.12 78.37 73.35 -0.10 0.07
AEX 65.52 61.29 -0.15 0.13 74.45 67.42 -0.12 0.11
CAC 40 66.00 57.43 -0.13 0.13 72.55 64.79 -0.11 0.08
IBEX 35 61.27 57.01 -0.14 0.10 66.85 62.21 -0.11 0.08
FTSE MIB 57.95 57.55 -0.09 0.16 66.50 63.18 -0.05 0.10
FTSE 46.76 49.48 0.01 -0.06 57.80 52.97 -0.09 -0.05
SMI 93.31 48.86 -0.15 -0.03 98.97 52.90 -0.18 -0.03
SAX 74.41 42.84 -0.03 0.04 76.71 66.39 -0.42 0.04
Euribor 5.03 1.69 4.75 1.76
Libor GBP 7.44 2.62 7.14 2.65
Stibor 3.61 1.57 3.63 1.79
Libor CHF 11.18 11.01 10.52 10.52
F1 denotes monetary policy dates and F2 all other dates.
of major stock indices, and particularly those of short-term interest rates, are substan-
tially higher on monetary policy action dates than on other dates. Descriptive statistics
for all series shown in Table 1 suggest the general validity of this identication approach
in the euro area. Moreover, the correlation coecient between the short-term interest
rate and major stock indices is negative on monetary policy action dates and positive
on other dates. This matches our expectation of a negative relationship between stock
market prices and monetary policy shocks. As argued by the present value model (see
e.g. Crowder (2006)), monetary policy inuences stock markets in two dierent ways.
First, today's monetary policy inuences the expected future cash ow and second, it
aects the discount rate of nancial market participants. Thus, a hike in the monetary
policy rate will lead to a decline in stock prices.10
Finally, we apply the Hausman test for endogeneity, which supports the hypothesis of
an endogeneity problem in the data. In fact, the null hypothesis that OLS estimation is
consistent must be rejected at the 5% signicance level for all countries.11
10An exception in our dataset is the FTSE, which suggests that we might not nd a signicant
reaction in the regression analysis.
11Switzerland is an exception here, possibly because there is very little variation in the Swiss Libor
rates. An explanation is that there is no domestic Swiss money market rate, only the Libor, which is
10The results obtained by application of the generalised identication-through-
heteroscedasticity approach support most of our expectations. Table 2 presents the
reaction of European stock market indices (DAX 30, AEX, CAC 40, IBEX 35, FTSE
MIB, FTSE, SAX, and SMI) to monetary policy actions by four central banks (ECB,
BOE, SNB, and the Riksbank).
In the left part of the Table 2, giving estimation results before the nancial crisis, we
nd that most stock markets have negative reactions to ECB monetary policy.12 The
size of the coecients can be interpreted as the change in daily stock returns following
a change in the respective short-term interest rate of 100 basis points. Thus, in the case
of an ECB monetary shock of about 25 basis points, stock markets in Europe tend to
fall by approximately 1 basis point.13 Thus, we nd that eects of ECB monetary policy
within European stock markets are symmetric, as the magnitude of the coecients is
similar in our sample. Moreover, statistically, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal
coecients across the dierent stock markets.
Moreover, we nd signicant monetary policy spillovers from the ECB to Swiss and
British stock markets. In line with our expectations based on the descriptive statistics,
there are no spillovers from Swedish or Swiss monetary policy actions to the major
European stock indices. Furthermore, we observe no reactions by Swiss, Swedish, or
British equity markets to domestic monetary policy.
At least in case of the United Kingdom this outcome is somewhat surprising, but
may be explained by the fact that, rst, average ination in Great Britain tends to
be above the ocial ination target and British market participants do not expect the
BoE to react to future ination risks to their full satisfaction. Second, monetary policy
might have asymmetric eects and thus specic sectors react more than the broad index.
This explanation is supported by previous studies, e.g. Bredin et al. (2007). They nd
signicant eects of British monetary policy on various sectoral subindices, but only
weak eects on the FTSE itself. In case of Switzerland, the lack of reaction to domestic
monetary policy might be due to the way the SNB conducts monetary policy. It does
not employ an interest rate target but a wide range for the Swiss Libor.
Next, we check the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we extend the
sample period by including observations from the nancial crisis period. As the right
likely inuenced by many factors other than Swiss monetary policy.
12Sweden is an exception here. We nd no signicant reaction of the Swedish SAX to either domestic
or foreign monetary policy shocks.
13We control for 11 September 2001 by including a dummy variable. Excluding this impulse dummy
does not notably change our results.
11Table 2: Instrumental variable estimation results
until August 2007 until December 2009
ECB BoE SNB Riks ECB BoE SNB Riks
Germany -4.15** -1.59 -0.10 0.74 -4.08* -0.70 -0.31 0.74
(1.96) (1.88) (0.37) (1.04) (2.31) (2.12) (0.39) (1.03)
Netherlands -4.73*** -1.51 0.28 0.14 -4.91** -0.58 0.16 0.64
(1.77) (1.69) (0.33) (0.94) (2.17) (1.99) (0.37) (0.97)
France -4.23*** -0.07 -0.02 0.42 -5.17** -1.09 0.21 0.60
(1.70) (1.63) (0.32) (0.90) (2.09) (1.91) (0.35) (0.93)
Spain -3.92** 0.73 -0.11 0.78 -4.11** 1.44 -0.15 0.94
(1.65) (1.58) (0.31) (0.87) (1.98) (1.81) (0.346) (0.88)
Italy -3.32*** -0.65 -0.12 0.97 -3.26* 0.40 -0.17 0.97
(1.62) (1.55) (0.30) (0.86) (1.98) (1.81) (0.34) (0.88)
UK -3.37** -0.77 0.03 0.02 -3.64** -0.32 -0.06 0.47
(1.37) (1.32) (0.26) (0.77) (1.79) (1.64) (0.30) (0.80)
Sweden -3.02 -0.01 -0.42 0.43 -3.04 0.17 -0.48 0.76
(2.04) (1.96) (0.38) (1.08) (2.34) (2.15) (0.40) (1.05)
Switzerland -4.02*** 0.55 0.13 0.29 -4.33** 0.80 0.13 0.61
(1.51) (1.45) (0.28) (0.80) (1.79) (1.64) (0.30) (0.80)
number of observations: 419 number of observations: 483
* 10% signicance level, ** 5% signicance level, *** 1% signicance level
Values in parentheses are standard errors.
hand columns in Table 2 show, our results are quite robust with regard to a change in
the sample period. When including data from the nancial crisis period, the coecient
estimates barely change and are not signicantly dierent from those estimated over the
pre-crisis period. In general, the signicance of the estimated parameters diminishes
when estimating the models over the extended sample. During the crisis period, central
banks conducted various unorthodox monetary policy operations (e.g. term auctions
in cooperation with other central banks) to increase market liquidity. This might help
explain the reduction in statistical signicance in the case of some of the estimators.
Second, we employ a dierent set of non-monetary policy dates. Instead of the day
preceding council meetings, we utilise observations from one week before. Again, we nd
that this variation does not signicantly change our results. Third, we include dummies
in the analysis to control for (i) specic eects of the nancial crisis and (ii) the direction
of monetary policy, i.e., we test for asymmetries in the strength of stock market reactions
depending on the direction of interest rate changes. Again, our results prove to be robust.
Fourth, we employ three-month money market rates rather than one-month rates. This
variation has only a negligible inuence on our results. Fifth, we employ the FTSE
12Table 3: Comparison of multi- and bivariate estimation (until August 2007)
Results of multivariate estimation Results of bivariate estimation
ECB BoE SNB Riks ECB BoE SNB Riks
Germany -4.15** -1.59 -0.10 0.74 -2.49*
(1.96) (1.88) (0.37) (1.04) (1.44)
Netherlands -4.73*** -1.51 0.28 0.14 -2.83**
(1.77) (1.69) (0.33) (0.94) (1.29)
France -4.23*** -0.07 -0.02 0.42 -2.76**
(1.70) (1.63) (0.32) (0.90) (1.27)
Spain -3.92** 0.73 -0.11 0.78 -2.11*
(1.65) (1.58) (0.31) (0.87) (1.20)
Italy -3.32*** -0.65 -0.12 0.97 -1.70
(1.62) (1.55) (0.30) (0.86) (1.13)
UK -3.37** -0.77 0.03 0.02 -0.51
(1.37) (1.32) (0.26) (0.77) (0.67)
Sweden -3.02 -0.01 -0.42 0.43 -4.70
(2.04) (1.96) (0.38) (1.08) (4.01)
Switzerland -4.02*** 0.55 0.13 0.29 -56.10
(1.51) (1.45) (0.28) (0.80) (64.00)
* 10% signicance level, ** 5% signicance level, *** 1% signicance level.
Values in parentheses are standard errors.
350 and the FTSE All-Share indices instead of the FTSE 100 but that does not change
results either. 14 Finally, we compare our multivariate results to estimations obtained
employing the original Rigobon and Sack (2004) approach. Our potentially superior
system approach indicates a bias in the bivariate estimations. As shown in Table 3,
the magnitude of the estimators in our multivariate estimations is systematically larger,
except for Switzerland and Sweden. Thus, in line with the theoretical expectation of the
properties of the respective estimators, real eects of monetary policy are underestimated
in the original Rigobon and Sack (2004) framework.15
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the approach of identication through heteroscedasticity of
Rigobon and Sack (2004) to a multicountry and multimarket model and prove that this
14Results are available on request.
15However, we cannot clearly distinguish between the potential reasons for the observed bias. In
addition to the bias inherent in the bivariate approach, it could be due to omitted variables or variations
in the number of observations. A detailed analysis of the relative importance of these potential reasons
for the superiority of the multivariate approach is left to future research.
13can be implemented using instrumental variable estimation. In an empirical application,
we examine the inuence of monetary policy on domestic and foreign stock markets.We
apply our novel system estimator to data on European short-term interest rates, as an
indicator of monetary policy, and various stock market indices, as important nancial
markets. Our analysis shows that the ECB signicantly inuences euro-area equity
markets. An increase in short-term interest rates by 25 basis points decreases stock
market prices by about 1 basis point. Moreover, our analysis reveals that there are
signicant monetary policy spillovers from ECB monetary policy shocks to British and
Swiss equity markets. In contrast, domestic monetary policy in the United Kingdom,
Sweden, or Switzerland has no inuence on other European stock market indices.
When extending the sample period to cover the nancial crisis, we nd that our es-
timated coecients do not change signicantly. Thus, our estimations are quite robust.
However, our results also show that some stock markets react less strongly to changes
in key interest rates. We believe that this is due to the much greater importance of
unorthodox monetary policy measures undertaken during the nancial crisis. Compar-
ing our multicountry and multimarket estimator to the original approach put forward
by Rigobon and Sack (2004) ifor our dataset, we nd that our coecient estimates are
signicantly larger in absolute terms. These empirical ndings are in line with our ex-
pectations based on econometric theory, which suggests that in a situation of integrated
nancial markets, the original bivariate approach is biased.
Comparing our estimates using the original Rigobon and Sack (2004) approach with
previous ndings by Bohl et al. (2009), we nd that our qualitative ndings for stock
market eects due to domestic monetary policy are broadly similar, but that our esti-
mated coecients are smaller. This dierence is probably due to the inclusion of all
meeting dates of the councils, instead of focusing on pre-selected shock days as done by
Bohl et al. (2009). In our view, it is likely that days characterised by particularly large
deviations from expectations cause stronger nancial market reactions.
Finally, the ecient market hypothesis of Fama (1970) implies that news that reaches
nancial markets is immediately incorporated into market prices. However, we demon-
strate, at least in the short-run, that monetary policy is not neutral. Moreover, we nd
evidence that there are spillover eects from foreign monetary policies to other countries'
nancial markets.
In a world of integrated nancial markets, the results of our study have two impor-
tant implications for the conduct of monetary policy. First, in line with Bohl et al.
(2009), we nd evidence that the ecient market hypothesis does not hold in the short
14run. Monetary policy has a signicant impact on nancial markets. Second, we detect
spillover eects from ECB monetary policy to British and Swiss equity markets. IThus,
the ECB, which is legally obliged to focus on the euro area, ought to be aware of the
spillover eects its monetary policy actions have on other nancial markets. Addition-
ally, other central banks, e.g., the BoE, need to consider the inuence of ECB monetary
policy on their domestic nancial markets when conducting monetary policy.
Finally, the link between monetary policy and nancial markets is of particular interest
in a period of nancial turmoil. We nd that the absolute size of the eect of interest
rate changes on equity markets does not signicantly decline during the nancial crisis.
However, the reduction in statistical signicance of the estimated coecients reects the
fact that the variance of interest rates during the nancial crisis is quite low, thereby
no longer aecting stock market returns. Thus, our ndings are in accordance with the
observation that standard monetary policy, which focuses on interest rates as the main
monetary policy instrument, was superseded by frequent use of unorthodox monetary
policy measures during the crisis period.
This work is a starting point for fruitful paths of future research. Our generalised mul-
timarket and multicountry approach can be applied toother parts of the world where
nancial market spillover eects might be particularly important. For instance, studying
the inuence of the Federal Reserve Bank on Canadian nancial markets looks promising.
Also, recent research shows that modern monetary policy does not rely only on actions,
i.e., interest rate changes, but also on communication of the monetary stance and eco-
nomic outlook (Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007); Hayo et al. (2011)). Our analysis of
central bank meeting dates could be extended to include days of formal or informal
central bank communication and an analysis made of the eect these events have on
monetary policy issues.
15A. Mathematical Appendix
The full matrix of the reduced form is ut = Byt +  zt with
ut =
0
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To subtract the covariances some preconsiderations about the structure of these co-
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kj;j and lj = 1
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1 rowsum of country j
1 columnsum of country j ! 1 as both, rowsum and columnsum go either
to innity or to zero (depending on the underlying data). Be
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Due to the assumption of uncorrelated variances (ijij)F1   (ijik)F2 equal zero.
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